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CIVIL-MILITRAY RELATIONS AND THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCES’
MULTIDIMENSIONISM

Abstract
The feasibility of a multidimensional African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for
Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) is uncertain. This is despite the existence of a policy
framework initiating the ASF and regional mechanisms (RMs). The policy was adopted and
adapted to assume a multidimensional configuration, in May 2003 and in 2004 respectively.
More than ten years after its establishment, there exist an unconcluded debate on whether the
ASF and the regional mechanisms have achieved the multidimensional status-military, civilians
and police components. It is in this sense that reference to civil-military relations (CMRs) has
become almost a cliché of debates in the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping space. Indeed, the
sour relationship between the military and civilians has been described as a ‘hindrance’ to the
attainment of full operation capability by ASF structures earmarked for 2015. Whilst, the
realities of conflict in most parts of Africa is that militants have changed tact, rendering pure
military operation ineffective, the most effective response is for peace support operation (PSO)
actors to develop balanced structures to respond to these multifaceted peace and security threats
facing the continent. In this article, the significance of both structural and institutional
constraints are considered. The conclusion points to the need to adapt the ASF structures to the
African PSO realities, but more critically, improve its configuration and design in the light of the
lessons learnt since its establishment more than a decade ago.
Key words: Civil-military Relations; ASF; Multidimensionalism
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Introduction
Today, unlike yester-years, fighting is rarely carried out between uniformed soldiers from two or
more national armies. With the decrease in inter-state warfare and the growth of internal
conflicts and terrorist groups,1 conflict dynamics have moved into what this paper calls ‘the
informal sector.’ In the informality of warfare and asymmetric conflicts, combatants rarely have
uniforms, even in circumstances where they wore uniform, camouflage is the order of the day.2
Frequently, it is extremely difficult to identify who is fighting for whom. However, it is
important to note that this confusion is strategic, as it allows individuals and combat units to
operate more freely and with less risk of sanctions since the command structures are harder to
identify and ‘prove’. Nevertheless, while there may be fewer military battle casualties, there are
high human costs, including civilian casualties; they target hospitals and other humanitarian
infrastructures. Hence, rendering the war, unlawful and less conformity with the ‘rules of
engagement’ at least according to the International Humanitarian Law (IHL).3
Owing to this complex peace operation architecture on the continent, there is dire need to
consolidate capacities and to build an integrated force with diverse skill sets among peacekeeper.
This is more so in Africa because there is unpresented growth of ideological extremism and
radicalization of youth. Despite this state of affair, an African-owned intervention strategy is yet
to be operationalised.4 Nevertheless, efforts towards addressing this menace are underway,
though dawdling. For example, the adoption of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act in July
2000 and of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council in July 2002, marked
critical steps in building Africa’s capacity to address challenges of peace, security and stability
on the continent. In particular, the Peace and Security Council Protocol set out the African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA), designed as a set of institutions and standards to facilitate
conflict prevention, management and resolution.5 As part of the operationalization process of the
PSC protocol, the African Chiefs of Defense and Security (ACDS) gathered in Durban, South
Africa, in May 2003 to adopt the policy framework for the establishment of the African Standby

2

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol3/iss1/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2325-484X.3.1.1087

Onditi and Okoth: Civil-military relations and multidimensionalism

Force (ASF).6 In March 2005, a Road Map for the operationalization of the ASF was adopted at
an AU experts meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The main objective of this arrangement7 was
to develop multidimensional capacities (military, police and civilian peacekeepers) for
deployment in crisis situations.8 The Road Map for operationalization was earmarked for 2010 as
an Initial Operation Capability (IOC) and 2015 for Full Operation Capability (FOC).9

Several structural and systemic factors such as the inadequate political will, and the limited
involvement of the local population in the planning and execution of peace processes have been
attributed to sluggishness in realization of an integrated ASF.10 The ratification of the African
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIR) has raised more questions than solutions to
the impasse.11 Scholars have proffered institutional failure for the ASF’s inoperative.12 First, the
traditional reluctance of African states to yield sovereignty to supranational arrangement
considerably obstructs political cooperation and integration towards a Pan-African ASF. Without
some transfer of decision-making and intervening power to the regional level, member states
could pursue their own national interests with few institutional constraints, often at the cost of
the broader integrated ASF agenda. Second, the hegemonic tendencies of some AU member
states, often subvert good ideas into politico-ideological differences among bureaucrats in Addis
Ababa. This often leads to failure to reach common position on further cooperation or
integration. Third, the weak economic and infrastructural base of most African countries and the
perceived unequal gains from the regional peace and security arrangements obstructs the
evolution of ASF. Fourth, the overlapping memberships of many African states in multiple
regional bodies often leads to conflicts of loyalty and usurps efforts that would otherwise drive
the operationalization of ASF.
Since the 1960s, African states have embraced regional integration as the key to political
cooperation and building functional institutions for tackling challenges facing the continent,
including peace and security threats. Although several initiatives have been taken to realize such
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dreams, structural limitations pose challenges in equal measure. Some critiques of the AU
institutions have observed that one of the key problems restraining Africa from achieving its
development, peace and security goals is the way in which governance in Africa and institutions
at various levels are constituted, structured and managed.13 The consequences of these
weaknesses are that they have an inhibitive effect on the ability of these structures to mobilize
and deploy human capacities. Poor leadership and cynical relationships between sub-regions
partly shape these structural and systemic problems, thus hindering meaningful generation of
proportional capacities required to conduct peace operation. In view of this protracted structural
and systemic failures, some scholars have observed that some African heads of state’s support to
collective efforts, be it economic or security, is merely driven by parochial-individual needs to
enhance their image and stature through forays in foreign affairs.14 Yet, it is only through
genuine improvement in these factors that the operationalization of ASF can have increased
chance of success. But as this article illustrates, compared with its policy requirements,
insufficient enhancement in such conditions means ASF or even the recently instituted ACIRC
will continue to remain a dream in the face of increased violent extremism and complex
peacekeeping operations. It is a fact that donors and development partners are running out of
patience in pumping resources in building regional mechanisms (RMs) that seem to lack an
important parameter-timelines for operationalization.
In both academic and policy arena, seldom has any discussion really queried the necessity
of these mechanisms vis-à-vis peace operation effectiveness. Thus, this article is a contribution
to a dispassionate, empirically based understanding of the dynamics surrounding institutional
evolution of the ASF. It challenges earlier accounts that ASF has attained multidimensional
status by demonstrating its structural and systemic short-comings, at the same time suggesting a
reconfiguration of these RMs so as to face the unprecedented asymmetric war fare and intraconflicts that continues to pose threats to peace and security across Africa. Indeed, with
increasing number of asymmetric warfare and intricacies of human security failure in most
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),15 the question has become more complicated as to
whether the peacekeeping force of numbers and the possession of a combat-ready force—is the
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panacea for peace operations success?16 In this article we doubt that the concept of the ASF and
ACIRC as they conceptualized and progressed can be lauded; and if the ASF and ACIRC are
somewhat laudable, as an increasing number of policy analysts argue, then the time and effort
put into these mechanisms should be ploughed into processes with more impact on success of
PSOs.17 For example rather than exorbitantly investing in ambivalent structures and defense
sectors, AU in collaboration with RMs and regional economic communities (RECs) could
strengthen liaison and coordination mechanisms for the already existing capacities (development,
humanitarian, political etc) towards conflict preventive diplomacy initiatives.

Building Structures We Can’t Use: The Fundamental Paradox?
There are radical views that the AU is an elitist and statist framework whose roles and functions
as an overarching institution need to be re-thought.18 In regard to the need for institutional
reforms, Vusi Gumede, one of the leading African development scholars has recommended that
in order for rethinking to happen among African leaders, the continent need to build a culture of
thought leadership in those bestowed with responsibilities of driving the African development
agenda.19 Similar thoughts have been projected, that with institutional reforms, Africa has the
potential of reducing poverty to below 15% by 2030, and below 4% by 2045.20
In response to this criticisms and appreciation, Addis Ababa (AU HQ) has made strides
in coordinating development of institutions and structures, particularly those aimed at supporting
peace and security agenda. One such institution is the ASF embedded within the African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA). The ASF’s mandate is drawn from Article 13 of AU Peace
and Security Council (PSC). The ASF is expected to enhance multidimensional capacities
through training, coordination and collaboration with other non-state actors and international
agencies. The AU’s Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) oversees the RMs which are
embedded in the five Regional Economic Communities: the Eastern Africa Standby Force
(EASF); ECOWAS standby force (ESF); North Africa Regional Capability (NARC); SADC
Standby Force (SSF); and the Central Africa Multinational Force (FOMAC). Among the five
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forces, EASF and ECOWAS standby forces have made significant strides in institutionalizing
the three components i.e. civilians, police and military. There have also been efforts among these
forces to increase participation of civilians and police in both planning and peacekeeping
missions. The participation of civilians and police to the African-led International Peacekeeping
Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are an
illustration of how some of the ASF structures are making progress towards integration of
capacities.21 However, lessons learnt from previous civil-military interaction during the Africanled operation in Sierra Leone and Liberia indicate unyielding tensions between civilian and the
military in the peacekeeping missions. It is indeed, a common scene to witness the military
referring to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as ‘a world of fractured individuals full
of weird and wonderful people.’ On the other hand, the non-uniformed peacekeepers do not hold
ego, in many occasions, when referring to the relationship between the host community and the
military, they often refer to them as ‘individuals marked by a variety of traditions and rigiditysometimes creating a debilitating environment in mission areas.’22
In response to these sour civil-military relations, observers have cautioned that this type
of behavior from both sides may lead to fragmentation of peace operation actors hence hindering
the attainment of effective multidimensional capacities.23 In order to address this policy
dilemma, this article will ground the discussion on key concepts drawn from the civil-military
relations theoretical framework In order to address this policy dilemma, this article will ground
the discussion on key concepts drawn from the civil-military relations theoretical framework 24,
followed by discussion on the normative and practical causes of civil-military discordance.
Analysis of the difficulties encountered by other salient actors on peace and security, such as the
the Civil Society Organization (CSO) in engaging the AU will be done and, finally the article
will conclude by highlighting policy options for PSO and peacekeeping actors on the continent
and beyond.
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Conceptual Issues and Civil-Military Relations Theory
Multidimensional approach to peace operations became live in Africa after the reformation of
African Union in 2002. This was occasioned by the intra-conflicts that surged after 1990s.
Central to this campaign was the need to transition from military operation to an integrated force
that combines the military, police and civilians in peace missions. It is worth noting that both the
UN and AU peacekeeping operations doctrines define multidimensional peacekeeping operations
as a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundation for
sustainable peace. The implication is that this approach is linked to the activities of PSO. Indeed,
the AU PSO doctrine identifies PSO as “a multifunctional operation in which impartial activities
of diplomatic, military and civilian, and police components normally in pursuit of the United
Nations Charter purposes and principles, work to restore or maintain peace in a mandated area of
operations.”25 The UN peacekeeping operations highlight four features of a modern PSO: 1) It is
aimed at establishing a liberal democracy-political systems and societies within states; 2) They
combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks if a ceasefire breaks
down, e.g. the case of Bosnia, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 3) it has a
strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian agencies, and police
and justice officers, e.g. the case of Liberia and Cambodia; and 4) PSO activities attempt the
impartial enforcement of a political settlement.26
However, the African PSO model presents geopolitical and operational challenges.27 For
instance, while the practice within the UN peacekeeping is that the United Nations can only
engage where there is peace to keep more often translates into the United Nations abandonment
of some of the most challenging crises in Africa. The failure of the UN to prevent the 1994
Rwandan genocide is a case in point. Moreover, partnership between UN and the AU in peace
operations lacks coordination (the Hybrid operations in Darfur, Liberia, Somalia, and Mali),
partly attributed to different levels of experience in organization of peace operations, and the
notion that the UN can only engage in a crisis when there is peace to keep is unacceptable to
Africa.28 The expansion of the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo
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(DRC) to respond to the March 23 Movement (Congolese Revolutionary Army) in 2014 and the
review of the mission in South Sudan during the fragile peace agreement signed in April 2016
were both exceptional. The South Sudan crisis in 2016 presented the most complex situation in
terms of peace operation as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hit spate
of dilemma on who should be treated as the ‘enemy’, when in fact, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Amy in Opposition (SPLA-IO) led by former First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar,
could neither be classified as belligerent group nor the opposition. The lesson for policy makers
particularly, in the South Sudan case was that, a combination of operational factors, including the
need to maintain fragile ceasefires, stabilizing proxy conflict, as well as the internecine and
fratricidal nature of contemporary conflicts require flexibility and functional adaptation to the
multidimensional nature of PSO capacities required. However, remaining consistent with
UN/AU purpose and principles in a milieu of evolving realities of international systems as well
as the changing tactics by belligerents, remains a daunting task, particularly for the African
peacekeepers, where in the first place there is rarely peace to be kept due to either weak
government forces vis-vis relatively powerful militarily armed opposition (MAO) groups like
the case of South Sudan or the Somalia’s clan-based intractable proxy conflicts, sometimes
fueled by those leading the peace process.
Multidimensional approach to peace operation is a product as well as a response to the
ever-changing peace and security architecture. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a
primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state
wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements i.e. the military, police and civilian. The
civil-military cynic in this arrangement is whether the military and civilians can work together to
foster sustainable peace.29 These operations are intended to support peacemaking between states
by creating the political space necessary for the belligerent states to negotiate a political
settlement. While multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations comprise a mix of
military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable
peace, peace enforcement operations aim to impose the will of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution upon the parties to a particular conflict in accordance with UN Charter
Chapter VII. The African PSO continues to evolve as the continent witnesses among other
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challenges, oppression resulting from the return of military coup, ethnic strife, economic distress,
the collapse of political order as well as break down in democratic structures resulting from
prolonged conflicts in some countries. Moreover, the asymmetric warfare mainly common
among the religious extremists such as the Al-Shabaab (Horn of Africa) and Boko Haram
(northern Nigeria) form one of the latest unprecedented changing tactics among militant groups.
It is therefore, important to note that, ‘boots and gun fire’ alone cannot handle this nature threats.
The point, however, is whether the interaction between the military and civilians (civil-military
relations) supports the development of multidimensional capacities within ASF regional
arrangement to respond to the emerging multifaceted threat or the ASF and RMs are simply
statures of military forces. In view of the emerging threats to peace and security and the need for
more effective coordination of actors, a possibility of a new theory of civil-military relations is
suggested.30
In the recent years, the role of the military in the society and international politics can be
traced in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 as well as the
onset of the Korean War in 1950. It should be noted, though, that theorization and application of
the concept of civil-military relations has been done beyond these two Cold War events. For
example, the works of intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Charles
Moskos, and Henry Kissinger brought to the limelight the culture of military professionalism.31
And perhaps, what looks like the foundation of and institutionalization of the idea of civilmilitary relations can be obtained from Samuel Huntington’s thesis on the relationship between
the state, society and the military. Samuel Huntington’s seminal presentation of the normative
theory can be considered as a cornerstone of traditional civil-military relations theories.32 In his
institutional approach model, Samuel Huntington fronts objective civilian control. This approach
suggests that civilian leaders should have absolute control over the defense and security policy.
According to Samuel Huntington, the notion of civilian denotes the executive arm of the
government led by the head of state.33 Based on the American society, “the soldier or military, is
a professional man who exists only to respond to the rare emergency, and then disappears from
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sight until needed again.” However, Huntington cautions against politicians interfering with the
military, lest there be anarchy.34 He further argues that with the achievement of objective civilian
control, there would be a balancing distribution of political power between civilians and military
spheres.35 In our view, this presents the most auspicious contribution towards modern politics,
peace, security and more recently, and the phenomenon of multidimensional approach to peace
and security that has blossomed among nations including those in Africa.
Moreover, the other typology of civility is the general public as they relate with the
uniformed personnel, either in the streets, barracks or in peace missions. Over time, states have
regionalized their power, governance, security and politics. As a result of this regional
integration, macro states have emerged. Some refer to them as regional blocs or communities.
Within these communities of nations and specifically within the African regional integration
rubric, security arrangements have emerged, simply referred to as regional mechanisms or
standby forces. These structures form part of the AU’s institutional development. Formation of
the ASF structures followed what Skocpol refers to as normative institutionalism.36 As Frances
Cleaver37 puts it, the emergence of these institutions is as a result of combining structures (both
physical and social), actions (such as PSO training) and processes (e.g. policy formulation). All
these processes are mediated by norms and values of those driving the processes.
The functional interaction between civilians and the military is key to these processes.
For example, the effectiveness of a PSO training conducted by Peacekeeping Training Centres is
measured against its ability to support development of an integrated database and networking
platforms that encourage exchange of information among peacekeepers. Therefore, within the
context of AU PSO, it is important that structures established to develop peacekeeping and peace
operation capacities (including, regional mechanisms, regional economic communities, regional
organizations, Peacekeeping Training Centres of Excellence, the African Peace Support Trainers
Association (APSTA), Think Tanks and civil society organizations) and decision-making
processes (AU) and governments) are inclusive of civilians, police and the military. In this way,
the PSO environment will be able to: effectively develop access, mobilize and deploy integrated
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capacities within the required time according to the six African PSO scenarios; enhance
exchange of information; and increase capacity of peacekeepers to conduct integrated rapid
deployment during emergencies. It is thus expected that for peace to be there, PSO actors do not
necessarily require ‘boots’ on the ground. Instead, promotion of positive civil-military
interaction that results in integrated human capacities is central to any intervention.
As we shall see, the outcome of the ASF evolution towards multidimensional status has
not been linear. Instead, it is roughed by dynamics of power relations between the military,
police and civilians. At the strategic level, the power relation game gets intensified with the
oversight regional bodies sometimes engaging in ill competition for donors and duplication of
efforts, ultimately leading to discordance.

Macro-level Issues and Multidimensionalism
In the last two decades, the world has seen a proliferation of asymmetric warfare s from rebel
armies to insurgency cells, government-linked paramilitaries to local defence groups.38
Contemporary command structures tend to be loose, with frequent switches in allegiance. Where
structures are formalised, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa armed groups often present
themselves as alternative governments in order to extract money and favours from civilians,
while hiding behind a facade of legitimacy and marginalisation. Examples of this phenomenon
can be seen in the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement and the National Congress for
Defence of the People in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
The most devastating development in contemporary conflict is the deliberate targeting of
civilians, due in part to the strategic blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians. The
former often live or find shelter in villages and refugee camps, sometimes using civilians as
human shields. The targeting of civilians most often involves killing, maiming and sexual
violence, with claims that these acts are in reprisal for suspected support of the opposition or for
attacks by opposing forces. In other instances, combatants force civilians to support their efforts.
This support, whether voluntary or forced, places civilians at greater risk of attack by the
opposing forces. Armed actors “seek to bring the battle more immediately, more systematically,
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and more massively to the core of the civilian population”39. The increased use of children as
combatants and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are also part of the shocking
development in contemporary conflict. In fragile states such as South Sudan, repeated
resumption of ethno-political conflict has deteriorated the country into a humanitarian
catastrophe.40 The unconventional nature of these conflicts demands change in tactics and
approach by various peace operation stakeholders. The thorny issues are: civil-military
coordination; geopolitics of the regions; the culture of militarization; and training-deployment
transition gap.41
First, it is critical to acknowledge the fact that the success of civil-military relationship
has been attributed to structured civil-military coordination. However, lack of structured
coordination among the ASF structures has been identified as the main challenge. For example,
the 2012/2013 Annual Review of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) sharply identifies lack of
effective coherent and coordinated measures by African-led missions in addressing conflicts in
Central Africa Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Mali and Somalia.42 Both United Nations43 and
African Union44 mission assessments reveal that in some cases such as in Mali and GuineaBissau, inconsistent application of agreed norms at AU and REC levels has led to near failure of
the mission. In other cases, lack of follow-up and inability to enforce agreed timelines as in the
case of Madagascar undermined progress. This therefore calls for the need to rethink the
apparently inadequate framework for coordinating various actors across the continent for timely
decision-making and effective response to crises.
Second, the geopolitics of regions has been found to facilitate or hinder development of
ASF structures. As regional forums, ECOWAS and the East African Community (EAC)
Commissions are capable of facilitating a collective approach to issues of common concern. But
the outcome of regional integration varies across regions. For example, whereas ECOWAS,
through its comprehensive Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security Framework, has established direct links with the local community in West Africa; the
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disconnect between the EAC and EASF has perpetuated the elitist approach to matters of peace
and security. For example, when South Sudan relapsed back into crises following the
disagreement between the incumbent President Silva Kiir and his former Deputy Dr. Riek
Machar in July 2016, EAC and EASF could not settle on a deployment plan. Even though IGAD
do not have peace enforcement mandate nor capability, its member states had to improvise
bilateral arrangement to sustain political negotiations. The highly contested bilateral arrangement
between President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda during the 2015 crises in this country revealed
the incapability of the region to mobilize a regional force for timely response to conflict as
earlier envisaged within the ASF policy framework. The ECOWAS Force has developed
linkages with the local community that enables the Commission to tap from the local knowledge
through forums and sporting activities using the bottom-up strategy in development of policies
and dissemination of the same policies to the locals. In this case, matters of peacekeeping are
well publicized among citizens for their contribution to the Commission. This is achieved
through various platforms, including engagement of civil society organizations working for
peace and stability in the region.45
On the contrary, the gap between the EAC, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) and the EASF has been attributed to the duplication of efforts among regional
organizations and mechanisms in the region.46 The dissonance among these regional structures
plays a more regressive than progressive role. For instance, one of the objectives of IGAD is to
foster peace and security, but there exist no solid coordination mechanism to ensure that both
institutions are coherent towards addressing peace and security challenges in the sub-region.
Building consensus on areas of cooperation is subject to both historical and structural challenges,
as is the case with Tanzania (dual participation in SADC and EAC) presents both challenges and
opportunities for further work on harmonization of the various peace and security regimes.
Scholars have warned that the sub-region’s fragile integration is responsible for the sluggishness
in realization of common security pacts, owed to several factors, among them; perception of lack
of political will, repeated mistakes of the past, lack of preparedness to implement the treaties in
its entirety and distrust among the political leaders. For instance, Tanzania initially challenged
admission of Rwanda and Burundi, citing that such a move would compromise members
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domestic industries, or relative stability, the same reasons were initially fronted against the
admission of the recently joined South Sudan.47
These structural factors are sustained by issues of political economy of leadership in the region.48
As such, EASF is largely controlled by the powerful structures with direct links to the regional
Heads of States and Governments. Decisions at the EASF force are an exclusionary affair
dominated by the Chiefs of Defense and the Defense Ministers who basically represent the
narrow interests of those in power as opposed to the ordinary citizens. This implies that, despite
the progress made at the EASF in regard to multidimensionality of the Force, the elitist approach
to the development of PSO capacities throws the future of these sub-regional structures into
policy lethargy. The avoidance approach to resolving cooperation tensions applied by Tanzania
has been consistent across many of the integration pillars.49 For instance, although, Tanzania
cooperated with Kenya in reviving the East African Community and in denying membership to
Rwanda and Burundi in 2000, until they had fulfilled the requirements of the protocol regarding
ascension. Eventually, Tanzania ‘defected’, and did not support Kenya in ratifying the use of ID
cards as a standard travel document for the East African Community, arguing that the nonbiometric nature of the IDs rendered them susceptible to forging and manipulation. Tanzania did
not support the common land ownership policy in any of the Partner States by any member of the
EAC.
Third, despite the existence of a policy framework on multidimensionality of the ASF
structures, Regional Mechanisms have evolved into a militarized culture. A recent study revealed
that out of the 200 concepts, constructs and abbreviations developed and used since the
establishment of ASF in 2004, majority 115 (57.5%) of them were military in nature.50 The total
number of ‘multidimensional’ concepts and constructs were 49 (24.5%), compared to those of
civilian nature 32 (16%). The police score on this variable raised more concern when it recorded
only 4 (2%). The result suggests that ASF structures not only frequently associate their programs
and initiatives with military tradition, but also, prioritise military requirements in resource
allocation. This has systematically excluded the police and civilian peacekeepers’ opportunities
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to increase both in number and policy influence. Yet, experience globally attests that
strengthening the peacekeeping policies and doctrines could help leverage military forces
towards adopting multidimensional approach to PSO.51
One fundamental advantage of multidimensional approach the capacity to response to
multifaceted nature of contemporary conflicts, protecting children and women, who often are
predisposed to risks of conflict could be protected through such strategies.52 One of the PSO
trainees had this to say: “We hear that the EASF has trained civilian experts in areas such as
protection of civilians, rule of law, corrections services, and child protection, my worry is, how
we shall coordinate and mobilize the civilian personnel for deployment when the FOC is
declared in 2014-2015. In the first place very few people understand how EASF operates.
Information flow does not reach civilians except for those seconded at the force head quarter or
those working with government sectors such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Interior.”53
The fourth issue is that key actors in African PSO have inadequately addressed the causes
of training-deployment transition gap. Whilst ASF structures have made tremendous effort to
prepare its force through training, the translation from training to field deployment remains low
for police and civilians. Even in circumstances where civilians and police benefit from PSO
training arrangements, it is evident that the gap between the military and civilian (including
police) is wider. For example, and looking at the analysis of the training organized by the EASF
during the regional Command Post Exercise (CPX) held in Adama city of Ethiopia, it was
established that transition rate for the military maintains the lead at 103 (62%) compared to
civilians’ 44 (30%). Military strategists recommend that modern military academies must
embrace the concept of a ‘thinking’ soldier, in which case, peacekeepers must be willing to
exercise resilience, flexibility and adapt to the operational environment.54 On this particular
initiative, the police recorded the least transition rate of 27 (21%). Moreover, the military was
found to record the highest (60) number of untrained peacekeepers on the exercise while civilian
and police components remain under-represented. This was partly attributed to lack of structures
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and systems for maintaining database and uncoordinated efforts among stakeholders involved in
building capacities of peacekeepers.
It is evident that inability of any peacekeeping force to deploy a multidimensional force
risks missing opportunities to make peace and protect civilians in hostile environments. Indeed,
both humanitarian practitioners and military scientists have alluded to the fact that
multidimensional peacekeeping forces have the ability to perform duties outside physical
security,55 especially in complex situations such as Somalia so as to handle shocks related to
poverty,56 clan division and environmental problems. The ASF structures are also influenced by
national politics in the respective member states. For example, until 2012, Uganda and Burundi
were the only bold countries contributing troops bilaterally to Somalia.57 Only 1,700 troops had
been operating in Somalia against the AU benchmark of 8,000 troops. Logistical challenges, lack
of political commitment and absence of a coordination mechanism to mobilize civilian expertise
has been blamed for lack of adequate capacities within AMISOM. Yet, the magnitude of the
situation required a multi-dimensional peace mission with estimated strength of 35,000
personnel.58
Invariably, AMISOM suffered troop’s interoperability. Inadequate arrangement for
preparedness including training on crosscutting issues had ripple effect on the effectiveness of
the troops to handle ‘soft’ issues of operation such as child protection and gender based violence
(GBV). Although the 2011 expanded AMISOM in support of the Transition Federal Government
(TFG) government and the addition of the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) realised greater
pacification of mostly coastal south region of Kismayu, this period ironically recorded the
highest cases of child abuse by peacekeeping personnel.59 Moreover, the incorporation of the
Kenya Defense Force (KDF) to the AMISOM in 2012 thus scaling up the troops to 18,000
multidimensional personnel, the AU forces, and UN facilities and workers in Mogadishu and
other coastal towns continued to encounter erratic attacks. The Al Shabaab’s public campaigns
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have indicated that one of the reasons they continue to make attacks is to revenge against the
AMISOM’s sexual harassment against their daughters and women.
The fifth and last issues ailing ASF structures are the lack of an ideological orientation
and the inability of peacekeepers within the ASF structures to adopt new mindset. While we do
not necessarily suggest that the military and police are not completely liberal, a recent study has
uncovered several ‘fault lines’ in the relationship between civilians and the military and that the
principle of the ‘melted pot’ anticipated among this generation of peacekeepers has not been
realized and is not likely to be tenable in 2015 or even beyond. 60 This is in spite of the fact that
since the advent of ASF in 2004, member states of EASF and ECOWAS have continuously
participated in PSO trainings and education programs hosted by the designated Peacekeeping
Training Centres (PKTCs). The question of political ideology and its role in civil-military
relations has enlisted mixed results. In both EASF and ECOWAS regions, peacekeepers are
found to be ‘moderate’ 63 (37.1%) compared to a mere 7 (4.1%) who belonged to the
‘conservative’ category. Another 59 (34.7%) believed that they were liberal in their approach to
life and that this partly influenced their relationship with their civilian colleagues. Such evidence
strengthens the understanding that the military personnel have maintained their ‘straight jacket’
attitude towards the wider society. Studies from middle income economies show that military
formations have evolved new political roles and devised survival tactics, particularly in closed
democracies.61 In Latin America, for example, Rut Diamint observes that the armed forces have
returned to the center of the political sphere as allies of some Latin American governments.62
Sexual and gender based violence among peacekeepers is not unique to Africa. Urben
Heidi has reported similar patterns of behavior among the military from developed nations.63 For
example, in applying similar methodology of survey across military barracks in the United States
of America (USA), Heidi found out that majority (75%) of military personnel are generally
conservative and affiliated to the ruling party.64 This implies that, although military formations
differ worldwide, the formation and development of a political ideology among a group of
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military officers is likely to display similar patterns of behavior when deployed in peace
missions. A widened fault-line between the military and civilians imply that such group of
peacekeepers will have difficulties in forging productive partnership and therefore lose
opportunities for synergy. Indeed, Stewart has faulted such mind set among peacekeepers who
remain rigid and thus a hindrance to modern counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques. Amid these
authoritarian tendencies among the military personnel, the greatest concern is that, there comes
increased exposure of the society to all sorts of security risks, abuse, forceful recruitment, sexual
abuse, detention and denied access to development opportunities. Most of these challenges could
be addressed through multi-agency, democratic and multidimensional approaches.65 In the next
section, the article, interrogates the difficulties faced by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in
engaging the AU. CSOs are here regarded as agents of change geared towards a
multidimensional approach to PSO. This requires innovativeness on how to embed non-state
actors in decision-making processes.66

Militarization of the Peace Operation Architecture: An Exclusive Club?
There are several ways of increasing multidimensionality of ASF and its regional
structures. Direct engagement of civil society organizations with AU is one of such approaches.67
Over the years, CSOs have continued to engage AU organs and institutions to ensure that the
voices of African people are heard and considered in the process of making decisions, which
affect their lives. However, despite the progress made including the Livingstone formula, which
requires close engagement of the Commission with CSOs, there remain challenges to this
relationship.
First, although the African Union may have undergone transformation, the institution’s
culture has remained rigid and exclusive to CSOs. Apart from a few exceptions to be based on
individual networks instead of official CSO-AU engagements, there is a need to develop
institutional relations between CSOs and the AU. Lack of trust and clear mechanisms for
engaging CSOs and other non-state actors work against possible synergies among stakeholders.
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Over the years, CSOs have been able to engage with various AU institutions by establishing
interpersonal relationships with various staff and office bearers. The flip side also means that
access to or engagement with the institutions will depend on the continued presence of particular
people and a need to constantly re-establish those relations. Even though AU cannot avoid
establishing interpersonal relations with international agencies, it could work to broaden CSO
space by making use of the few formal mechanisms specifically adopted to facilitate engagement
between them. One such institution is the African Governance Architecture (AGA). 68 Although
AGA’s linkage with other AU organs such as the APSA is yet to be clarified, it presents
opportunities for increasing participation of CSOs in decision-making.
Second, there is the perpetual problem of information failure. There is no culture of allowing
access to information among the AU institutions making it challenging to engage without free
flow of information. Currently, much of the information, which gets out is obtained through
interpersonal relationships, and subsequently shared amongst CSOs. This presents the
relationship unpredictable and that reliance on personal relationship to access information is not
sustainable. This is partly because, the AU’s decision making process is confined to member
states. According to the AU Act, ‘decisions’ of the AU Assembly are divided into three
categories: regulation, directives and recommendations, declarations, resolutions and opinions.
Regulations and directives are binding on members and AU organs, while decisions in the third
category are not binding on Member States. In practice, the Assembly mostly uses two terms,
decisions and resolutions, to denote its binding and non-binding findings, respectively. All
decision-making is characterized by consensus-seeking and the principle of equitable regional
representation. If decisions are not reached by consensus, a two-thirds majority is required.69
Similar challenges have been cited at country level. Jonathan Makuwira observes that, while the
change from dictatorial regimes in Malawi to a multiparty political system has enhanced civil
society participation in the country’s social, economic and political issues, the CSO–government
relationship is still fraught with suspicion and mistrust.70
Thirdly, the lack of enough resources remains a challenge to CSO-AU engagement.
Engaging at the continental level is resource intensive, not only for attending meetings, obtaining
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information and keeping track of what is happening, but also in establishing and maintaining the
necessary interpersonal relationships. This combined with apathy towards the institution and
limited access discourages many CSOs from engaging at the continental level. CSOs-AU is
strategically placed to bridge this gap between national level action and action at the continental
level, by virtue of its focus in tandem with its membership. It would however need to establish
formal mechanisms to ensure complementary input at both the national and continental levels.
The final complication is the diverse ideological orientation. There are essentially two
schools of thought within the AU on the process of integration. One school promotes immediate
integration with the creation of appropriate structures and subsequently filling in of the
institutional gaps, while the other promotes a gradual approach to integration with the building
up of existing structures into an eventually unified continent. The positions are contested with
policy makers who believe in progressive development of peace and security structures
(immediatists) lamenting the continued rhetoric, which has been ongoing before the creation of
the AU and the need for concrete action towards integration. On the other hand, the bureaucrats
who do not subscribe to hastier realization of an ASF (gradualists) are adamant about the need to
be realistic regarding the realities of the continent and the insufficient infrastructure and
resources to bring it all into being. In 2006, AU commissioned a study into the implications of
integration and has since held several ordinary and extraordinary sessions, made several
decisions and instituted several mechanisms towards the realization of the integration agenda.
Finally, lack of co-ordination between the AU institutions themselves and between the AU and
RECs means that CSOs have to engage multiple times and structures, as there is no guarantee of
a trickle effect. This means a heavier investment on the part of CSOs looking to bring their issues
to the AU discussion table.

Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that both structural and systemic factors have blighted the
possibilities of developing an integrated African Standby Force. Yet, the emerging African Peace
and Security Architecture is too dynamic to entrust peace and stability to military alone. The
need for an integrated ASF is articulated within the African Union Charter. As such, the Charter
points out, “ In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with
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respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h)
and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such a Force shall
be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military origins and
ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” (PSC Protocol art. 13.1). With the new
thinking in Addis Ababa on the best way to respond to crisis on the continent, such an ambition
seems increasingly difficult to realize. There are also, as yet, no signs that neither AU nor RMs
has managed to adapt either its policy-making structures or its policy to the emerging
asymmetric conflicts. The structural reforms needed to bring AU policy into line with emerging
PSO realities have instead developed a parallel structure-the African Capability for Immediate
Response to Crisis (ACIRC). ACIRC is heavily military concept with lethal potential of demultidimensionalising ASF and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The continued focus on
ACIRC by PSO actors implies that the previous efforts by RMs towards addressing
multidimensional capacity gaps have been eroded. Nevertheless, adapting ASF to the everchanging conflict realities and improving functional capabilities of RMs based on the lessons
learnt since the establishment of these structures in 2004 will increase likelihood of attaining
multidimensional capacities across Africa.
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